Post by Mr Modica on Feb 20, 2014 20:28:42 GMT
Henry VIII: Wolsey’s Foreign Policy?
Traditionally the period 1514-1529 has been regarded as Wolsey’s foreign policy; however more recent research has shown that Henry played a more important role than was previously imagined. The extent to which Wolsey was ‘doing his own thing’ (whether that be pursuing his own objectives secretly or manipulating Henry) or whether he was essentially carrying out the King’s instructions is unclear.
The interpretations of the motives behind English foreign policy at this time have changed over time. Until WW1 the view was that England was trying to maintain a ’balance of power’ (which was what England was doing prior to 1914!); in the 1920’s Pollard claimed Wolsey slavishly followed instructions from the Pope; in the 1960’s Scarisbrick demonstrated that Wolsey followed some Papal instruction as they tied in with his own objectives, and that England sought to ‘un-balance power’ by joining which ever was the stronger side, with a view to showing other powers that war was pointless. More recently historians have accepted an array of factors influenced policy:
• Wolsey’s concern to gain or extend legatine powers;
• Henry’s expectations;
• National interests;
• Papal interests;
• A desire to initiate an ‘era of peace’.
A different time different influences were at work.
Wolsey as Peace Maker
October 1518, Treaty of London, was designed to initiate a 20 year period of peace. Essentially the signatories agreed that if one of them attacked another then the others would attack them. Spain and the Papacy quickly adhered as eventually did France – but only after the sale back of Tournai and a promise that Mary, Henry VIII’s daughter, would marry the Dauphin.
The treaty built upon a Papal initiative for a five year truce and a crusade and as such it has traditionally been seen as an attempt by Wolsey to gain legatine powers, other have said it merely satisfied Wolsey’s ego – whichever it may be there were interests being put above English national interests.
Building on the success of the treaty, in 1520 Henry and Francis met near Calais at ‘The Field of the Cloth of Gold’, so called because of the extravagance of the tented accommodation and entertainments put on by the two monarchs. Whilst the FCG represented a PR triumph in reality it achieved little of concrete value, indeed meetings had to be arranged with Charles V to prove that England was not taking sides in the Habsburg-Valois struggle. What Henry seems to have valued though is the appearance given that England was the equal of the most powerful countries in Europe.
Wolsey and the Papal Tiara
In 1521 Pope Leo X died, but in the ensuing election Charles V, despite having promised to back Wolsey, supported his former tutor. In 1523, following the death of Pope Adrian VI, Wolsey failed to make his ambition known in time and the apparent support of a large number of Cardinals was based on the desire for bribes.
Traditionally it was assumed that Wolsey was actively attempting to become Pope, more recently it appears that he was merely humouring those who advanced his cause – in effect accepting the real politik of the situation.
The first impulse for Wolsey becoming Pope appears to have been made from Charles V who pointed out the kudos that would arise for Henry should his first minister become Pope. Wolsey seems to have gone along with this in an attempt to please Henry, but not with any real hope of securing the Papal Tiara. Indeed given his political skills his relations with the Papacy were such that he was clearly not trying to win friends and influence potential supporters. For example, he would sometimes fail to respond to urgent communications from Rome and in his responses appears rather to be interested in scoring points than winning allies.
The Habsburg-Valois conflict
In June 1519 Charles V became King of the Germans (he technically doesn’t become HRE until 1530 when he is crowned as such by the Pope), uniting the lands of Spain and the Empire. This not only meant the adoption of existing quarrels with France, but amongst the French led to a grounded fear of encirclement by hostile powers.
Given this fear Francis was keen to challenge Charles’ power in Italy, but certainly didn’t expect the terms of the Treaty of London to be applied to him. In response Charles and Wolsey met in August 1521 to arrange a response to Francis I’s actions – the up-shot being an agreement that an English army would attack France unless France agreed to make peace (Treaty of Bruges, November 1521). It is likely that Wolsey hoped some degree of prevarication would mean matters were resolved before an English army had to take the field. However Wernham has suggested that this treaty was part of Henry’s attempts to secure his dynasty as it included an agreement that when Mary reached 12 (1528) she would marry Charles V (this was ended in 1525 when Charles married Isabella of Portugal).
Henry however had other ideas an attempted to invade France whilst a rebellion by the Duke of Bourbon and attack by Charles was underway. Thus at short notice a 10,000 strong English army arrived in France in August 1523. A short but unsuccessful attempt to lay siege to Boulogne was re-directed in to a march towards Paris, which in turn became bogged down in mud. The campaign cost at least £40,000.
Given the lack of martial success Henry’s interest in invasion seems to have waned and Wolsey therefore seems to have reverted to a policy of stalling Charles whilst secretly negotiating with Francis for a general peace. However this policy was thrown in to disarray in February 1525 when a French army was destroyed by the Imperialists at Pavia in northern Italy. Francis was captured and, incidentally, Richard de la Pole – brother of Edmund and last of the ‘White Rose Party’ – was killed.
Henry tried to capitalise on the Imperial victory by suggesting that France be dismembered, he taking the western most areas and the title of King of France (something he claimed to be anyway) whilst Charles and the rebels took the rest. There was little in this plan to appeal to Charles, who freed Francis amid oaths of non-aggression and the giving of hostages – but within a year Francis and Charles were again at war.
Henry also tried to organise an attack on France whilst she was leaderless, but was unable to raise the finance given a major tax rebellion against the so-called ‘Amicable Grant’ of 1525.
Wolsey now encouraged an anti-Imperial agreement – the League of Cognac – in northern Italy, something the French could use to reverse the Imperial gains made at Pavia. In 1527 England signed an agreement with France threatening Charles that unless he came to terms with Francis England would attack him. This resulted in an English declaration of war on Charles in 1528, although no army ever took the field and an agreement was also signed with Charles that protected the trade links between England and the Netherlands.
Given this half-hearted approach it was only at the last minute that Wolsey could arrange for England to be included in the 1529 Treaty of Cambrai that brought peace (for a while) between Habsburg and Valois. It is clear though that Henry was not being treated as an equal by Charles and Francis and that had it not been for Wolsey’s last-minute face-saving intervention he would have been out in the cold. This change in fortune from 1520 may well have helped turn Henry away from Wolsey and is at least a part of the reason for the Cardinal’s fall in October 1529.
Traditionally the period 1514-1529 has been regarded as Wolsey’s foreign policy; however more recent research has shown that Henry played a more important role than was previously imagined. The extent to which Wolsey was ‘doing his own thing’ (whether that be pursuing his own objectives secretly or manipulating Henry) or whether he was essentially carrying out the King’s instructions is unclear.
The interpretations of the motives behind English foreign policy at this time have changed over time. Until WW1 the view was that England was trying to maintain a ’balance of power’ (which was what England was doing prior to 1914!); in the 1920’s Pollard claimed Wolsey slavishly followed instructions from the Pope; in the 1960’s Scarisbrick demonstrated that Wolsey followed some Papal instruction as they tied in with his own objectives, and that England sought to ‘un-balance power’ by joining which ever was the stronger side, with a view to showing other powers that war was pointless. More recently historians have accepted an array of factors influenced policy:
• Wolsey’s concern to gain or extend legatine powers;
• Henry’s expectations;
• National interests;
• Papal interests;
• A desire to initiate an ‘era of peace’.
A different time different influences were at work.
Wolsey as Peace Maker
October 1518, Treaty of London, was designed to initiate a 20 year period of peace. Essentially the signatories agreed that if one of them attacked another then the others would attack them. Spain and the Papacy quickly adhered as eventually did France – but only after the sale back of Tournai and a promise that Mary, Henry VIII’s daughter, would marry the Dauphin.
The treaty built upon a Papal initiative for a five year truce and a crusade and as such it has traditionally been seen as an attempt by Wolsey to gain legatine powers, other have said it merely satisfied Wolsey’s ego – whichever it may be there were interests being put above English national interests.
Building on the success of the treaty, in 1520 Henry and Francis met near Calais at ‘The Field of the Cloth of Gold’, so called because of the extravagance of the tented accommodation and entertainments put on by the two monarchs. Whilst the FCG represented a PR triumph in reality it achieved little of concrete value, indeed meetings had to be arranged with Charles V to prove that England was not taking sides in the Habsburg-Valois struggle. What Henry seems to have valued though is the appearance given that England was the equal of the most powerful countries in Europe.
Wolsey and the Papal Tiara
In 1521 Pope Leo X died, but in the ensuing election Charles V, despite having promised to back Wolsey, supported his former tutor. In 1523, following the death of Pope Adrian VI, Wolsey failed to make his ambition known in time and the apparent support of a large number of Cardinals was based on the desire for bribes.
Traditionally it was assumed that Wolsey was actively attempting to become Pope, more recently it appears that he was merely humouring those who advanced his cause – in effect accepting the real politik of the situation.
The first impulse for Wolsey becoming Pope appears to have been made from Charles V who pointed out the kudos that would arise for Henry should his first minister become Pope. Wolsey seems to have gone along with this in an attempt to please Henry, but not with any real hope of securing the Papal Tiara. Indeed given his political skills his relations with the Papacy were such that he was clearly not trying to win friends and influence potential supporters. For example, he would sometimes fail to respond to urgent communications from Rome and in his responses appears rather to be interested in scoring points than winning allies.
The Habsburg-Valois conflict
In June 1519 Charles V became King of the Germans (he technically doesn’t become HRE until 1530 when he is crowned as such by the Pope), uniting the lands of Spain and the Empire. This not only meant the adoption of existing quarrels with France, but amongst the French led to a grounded fear of encirclement by hostile powers.
Given this fear Francis was keen to challenge Charles’ power in Italy, but certainly didn’t expect the terms of the Treaty of London to be applied to him. In response Charles and Wolsey met in August 1521 to arrange a response to Francis I’s actions – the up-shot being an agreement that an English army would attack France unless France agreed to make peace (Treaty of Bruges, November 1521). It is likely that Wolsey hoped some degree of prevarication would mean matters were resolved before an English army had to take the field. However Wernham has suggested that this treaty was part of Henry’s attempts to secure his dynasty as it included an agreement that when Mary reached 12 (1528) she would marry Charles V (this was ended in 1525 when Charles married Isabella of Portugal).
Henry however had other ideas an attempted to invade France whilst a rebellion by the Duke of Bourbon and attack by Charles was underway. Thus at short notice a 10,000 strong English army arrived in France in August 1523. A short but unsuccessful attempt to lay siege to Boulogne was re-directed in to a march towards Paris, which in turn became bogged down in mud. The campaign cost at least £40,000.
Given the lack of martial success Henry’s interest in invasion seems to have waned and Wolsey therefore seems to have reverted to a policy of stalling Charles whilst secretly negotiating with Francis for a general peace. However this policy was thrown in to disarray in February 1525 when a French army was destroyed by the Imperialists at Pavia in northern Italy. Francis was captured and, incidentally, Richard de la Pole – brother of Edmund and last of the ‘White Rose Party’ – was killed.
Henry tried to capitalise on the Imperial victory by suggesting that France be dismembered, he taking the western most areas and the title of King of France (something he claimed to be anyway) whilst Charles and the rebels took the rest. There was little in this plan to appeal to Charles, who freed Francis amid oaths of non-aggression and the giving of hostages – but within a year Francis and Charles were again at war.
Henry also tried to organise an attack on France whilst she was leaderless, but was unable to raise the finance given a major tax rebellion against the so-called ‘Amicable Grant’ of 1525.
Wolsey now encouraged an anti-Imperial agreement – the League of Cognac – in northern Italy, something the French could use to reverse the Imperial gains made at Pavia. In 1527 England signed an agreement with France threatening Charles that unless he came to terms with Francis England would attack him. This resulted in an English declaration of war on Charles in 1528, although no army ever took the field and an agreement was also signed with Charles that protected the trade links between England and the Netherlands.
Given this half-hearted approach it was only at the last minute that Wolsey could arrange for England to be included in the 1529 Treaty of Cambrai that brought peace (for a while) between Habsburg and Valois. It is clear though that Henry was not being treated as an equal by Charles and Francis and that had it not been for Wolsey’s last-minute face-saving intervention he would have been out in the cold. This change in fortune from 1520 may well have helped turn Henry away from Wolsey and is at least a part of the reason for the Cardinal’s fall in October 1529.